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DARWIN'S VOYAGE THROUGH THE 
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE: 
A BEGUILING HYPOTHESIS 
Sandra Petersson * 
If we share a common ancestor, is it not reasonable to suppose the existence of common ancestral 
laws — at least at some point in our distant past? This paper proposes an (irreverent) evolutionist 
revision of John Austin's classification of law. In short, what if, instead of living next door to Jeremy 
Bentham, Austin had lived next door to Charles Darwin? How would that environment have changed 
Austin's analysis in The Province of Jurisprudence? 
I INTRODUCTION 
The field of jurisprudence often concerns itself with two central questions. The first is 
what is law? The second is what is good law? My intent is to address the first question "What 
is law?" However, as HLA Hart cautions, while many have tried to define the essential nature 
of law, none have succeeded. 1 So if the reader is not fully enlightened by this article, then I 
will have earned my place among eminent legal theorists. 
As a Canadian, I grew up in the Province of Alberta. I studied law in the Province of 
Alberta. I was admitted to the bar of the Province of Alberta. One of the detrimental effects of 
this background is that I tend to think of the Province of Jurisprudence as a physical place — 
somewhere you might want to go on sabbatical, but certainly not on vacation. The idea for 
this paper came from a beguiling daydream that it is a place where Charles Darwin might 
have voyaged on The Beagle. 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington. 
1 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (1 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) 2.
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As my title suggests, I will be drawing on the work of two very different theorists of the 
19th century: John Austin, positivist, and Charles Darwin, naturalist. Austin, of course, 
explores the nature of law in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, published in 1832 — a 
work whose significance to the study of jurisprudence has been such that many of us are only 
now beginning to realise that it is possible to admit that we have not read it. 2 Many lawyers 
and, indeed, many legal academics will be more familiar with Darwin's exposition of the 
laws of nature than with Austin's exploration of the nature of law. Darwin's theory of 
evolution initiated a paradigm shift in Western thought, one so fundamental that we do not 
need to read Darwin to feign familiarity with his work. However, it is perhaps to Austin's 
credit that Clarence Darrow was never asked to defend the legality of teaching positivism in 
public schools. 3 
Austin's work was heavily influenced by Jeremy Bentham, a close colleague and 
neighbour in Bloomsbury's Queen Square. Earlier scholars have observed the results of 
thinking inside the Square, cataloguing Bentham's and the Mills' influence on Austin, leaving 
little scope for original comment on the subject. 4 That there is currently a much needed gap in 
Austinian scholarship generally is evidenced by the dwindling number of articles on Austin's 
theory, less than twenty in as many years. 5 It is my intent to create and fill that gap by 
2 Others have read it but seemingly do not admit to it in public for fear of appearing jurisprudish. As 
Hilaire Barnett reports, Austin was still read in depth in 59 per cent of British jurisprudence courses in 
1994: "The province of jurisprudence determined — again!" (1995) 15 Legal Studies 88, 110­111. 
However, this represents a continuing decline in Austin's appeal, following a previous drop from 86 
per cent in 1974 to 69 per cent in 1984. In contrast, Austin is only read in depth in 13 per cent of 
Australian jurisprudence courses; hence, Darwin was the more likely choice for capital city of the 
Northern Territory. 
3 Scopes v The State (1927) 154 Tenn (1 Smith) 105, 289 SW 363. See also Edward J Larson Summer for the 
Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate over Science and Religion (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1997). 
4 The production of groundbreaking research by future generations is constantly undermined by the 
overzealous scholarship of earlier generations. In the field of jurisprudence alone, all the leading 
theorists have been analysed to death, including many who are still alive. At this rate, the only 
advances in scholarship will have to come from reflective analysis of one's own work prior to 
publication. 
5 The most notable recent events in Austinian scholarship are WL Morrison's study John Austin (Edward 
Arnold, London, 1982), Wilfrid E Rumble's The Thought of John Austin (Athlone Press, London, 1985) 
and his edition of The Province of Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995). The first 
two contain extensive bibliographies of Austinian scholarship. Recent articles published since Rumble's 
edition include: Bruce D Fisher "The ethical consumer: a rejecter of positive law arbitrage" (1994) 25
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advancing an analysis of Darwin's influence on Austin. My analysis is not befuddled by the 
strong possibility that Austin had no knowledge of Darwin's theory of evolution. Indeed, On 
the Origin of Species was first published on 24 November 1859, a few weeks after Austin was 
stricken by illness that would shortly prove fatal. I doubt whether it would have found a 
place on Austin's death­bedside table. Nor is the absence of any evidence suggesting that 
Austin and Darwin had ever met at any other point particularly discouraging. 6 After all, 
many great ideas in legal theory have taken wing on the basis of sheer hypothesis. 7 
How then would living next door to Darwin have influenced Austin's analysis in The 
Province of Jurisprudence? Part II Beyond the Boundaries of Jurisprudence, considers Austin's 
much­neglected category of metaphorical laws and the consequences a discussion with 
Seton Hall L Rev 230; Michael Lobban "Was there a nineteenth century 'English school of 
jurisprudence'?" (1995) 16 J of Legal History 34; Mauro Barberis "Universal legal concepts? A criticism 
of 'general' legal theory" (1996) 1 Ratio Juris 1; W Michael Reisman "A jurisprudence from the 
perspective of the 'political superior'" (1996) 23 Northern Kentucky L Rev 605; Wilfrid E Rumble 
"Austin in the classroom: Why were his courses on jurisprudence unpopular?" (1996) 17 J of Legal 
History 17; Gerald B Wetlaufer "Gunmen, straw men, and indeterminacy: HLA Hart, John Austin, and 
the concept of law" (1997) 82 Iowa L Rev 1487; William MacNeil "John Austin or Jane Austen? The 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined in Pride and Prejudice" (1998) 4 Law­Text­Culture 1; Robert G 
Scofield "The conclusion of Austin's 'A Note on Interpretation': Is it missing or misplaced?" (1998) 19 J 
of Legal History 270. 
6 Although Austin's wife Sarah maintained an extensive salon of prominent thinkers and literary figures, 
Darwin does not appear to have been among the guests: Lotte and Joseph Hamburger Troubled Lives: 
John and Sarah Austin (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985). 
7 For example, where would legal theory be today without the imaginative assistance of Hart's Rex 
dynasty, Dworkin's Hercules J, or Ross's Noît­cif tribe? (See Hart, above n 1, ch IV, Ronald Dworkin 
Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986), and Alf Ross "Tû­Tû" (1957) 70 Harvard L Rev 812. 
Perhaps the best theoretical hypothetical is Lon Fuller "The case of the speluncean explorers" (1949) 62 
Harvard L Rev 616­645, as proven by the fact that so many other theorists wish they had thought of it 
first. See the score of recent "decisions" in David L Shapiro "Foreword: A cave drawing for the ages" 
(1999) 112 Harvard L Rev1834; Alex Kozinski and others "The case of the speluncean explorers: 
Revisited" (1999) 112 Harvard L Rev 1876; Peter Stuber The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Nine New 
Opinions (Routledge, New York, 1998); James Allan The Speluncean Case: Making Jurisprudence Seriously 
Enjoyable (Barry Rose Law Publishing, Chichester, 1998); Alexander M Sanders Jr "Newgarth revisited: 
Mrs. Robinson's case" (1998) South Carolina L Rev 407; JB Ruhl "The case of the speluncean polluters: 
Six themes of environmental law, policy, and ethics" (1997) 27 Environmental L 343; James Allan "A 
post­speluncean dialogue" (1994) 44 J of Legal Education 519; and Naomi Cahn and others "The case of 
the speluncean explorers: Contemporary proceedings" (1993) 61 George Washington L Rev 1754. 
Alternatively, the burgeoning of Newgarth jurisprudence may simply indicate that many theorists long 
to be judges.
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Darwin might have had on Austin's hierarchical classification. Part III On the Origin of Law, 
looks for proof of these consequences by means of a case study to explore whether 
metaphorical laws might evolve upwards through Austin's classification, attaining the 
befitting status of proper laws. 
II BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF JURISPRUDENCE 
In The Province of Jurisprudence, Austin sets out a hierarchical classification of laws, based 
on an Aristotelian model of logic. His aim is to separate what he considers to be the core or 
essence of law from those phenomena that are improperly called law and that, therefore, 
obscure our understanding of the nature of law, that is to map out, by process of elimination, 
the boundaries of the province of jurisprudence. He concludes that only certain categories of 
man­made laws — positive laws and rules of positive morality amounting to express or tacit 
commands — are within the boundaries. However, "in order to describe the boundary which 
severs the province of jurisprudence from the regions lying on its confines," 8 Austin discusses 
other categories of "laws", both those properly and those improperly so called. It is here, 
beyond the boundaries of jurisprudence, that Austin and Darwin meet. 
Outside the boundaries of jurisprudence, but on a lower plain than that occupied by its 
man­made laws, Austin locates the metaphorical laws. As Austin describes, metaphorical 
laws result from the fact that "where ever we observe a uniform order of events, or a uniform 
order of co­existing phenomena, we are prone to impute that order to a law set by its 
author." 9 However, he considers that it is inappropriate to use the word "law" in referring to 
the cause of such phenomena, not least because there is no element of sanction or duty 
attached to them. Metaphorical laws, therefore, are not laws but are only like laws, related to 
proper laws by a slender analogy. 10 Thus far, Darwin is content to allow Austin to continue. 
As a first example of metaphorical laws, Austin cites the uniform movement of lifeless 
bodies. The movement of a pendulum, he notes, is a phenomenon often described as 
governed by the laws of physics. While a lifeless body could be said to move in a uniform 
mode through "the pleasure and appointment of God" this is not the same as being governed 
8 John Austin (HLA Hart ed) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1968) 2. Unless otherwise noted, all further references to Austin are to Hart's edition. 
9 Austin, above n 8, 173. 
10 For more on the metaphorical value of law, see WH Auden's "Law Like Love" in Edward Mendleson 
(ed) Collected Poems (New Vintage International, New York, 1991) 262. See also Petersson's ground­ 
breaking analysis in "Austin and Auden: The Journey Back to the Province of Jurisprudence", above n 4.
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by the operation of law. 11 A lifeless body, he adds, has no desires which may be coerced by 
sanction nor has it any sense of obligation. 12 Darwin begins to formulate an objection. 
As a second example of metaphorical laws, Austin presents the actions of the "lower and 
irrational animals." 13 Darwin is intrigued and holds back his objection. Austin offers two 
reasons to explain why animal conduct cannot be said to result from law. The first is that 
animals cannot understand the purpose and provisions of a law; the second is that animal 
conduct is based on instinct and experience and is neither motivated by duty nor coerced by 
sanctions. 14 Though Austin recognises that some animals can be coerced by sanction and 
could be said to "understand and observe laws set to them by human masters", he rejects 
these examples for the sake of simplicity. 15 The uniformity of animal conduct, he concludes, 
is merely another "effect of the Divine pleasure." 16 Darwin interjects but Austin begs to be 
allowed to summarise the basis of metaphorical laws: 17 
11 Austin, above n 8, 173. 
12 A post­Austinian example proves this point. In 1897, the State of Indiana proposed legislation to 
change the value of pi from 3.14 to 4, a more convenient figure in the days before calculators. However, 
pendulums in Indiana were not coerced by legal sanction and seemingly showed no sense of obligation 
to observe the new value of pi. They went about their business as before with the result that all clocks 
made with the new higher value of pi ran 15 minutes fast every hour, thus packing 30 hours in every 
day. The same phenomenon has been observed in law firms that operate on billable time, disproving 
the idea that lifeless bodies cannot be coerced by sanction. 
Unfortunately, the Indiana pi law is a misleading example though it is convenient to repeat the error: 
see also DJ Whalan "The Potential Power of Committees in a 'Hung' Parliament" (1994) 8 Otago L Rev 
151, 162. For reasons that escape common sense, the true story is that in 1897 State of Indiana proposed 
legislation to alter the value of pi from 3.14 to 16/√3 or 9.2376, the grossest over­estimation since 
calculations began: Petr Beckman A History of Pi (Golem Press, Boulder (Colorado), 1971) 170­3. Bill 246 
was passed unanimously by the State House of Representatives but did not get past second reading in 
the State Senate. That Bill 246 was never passed into law, however, has not dampened its use as an 
example of statutory futility. The failure of Bill 246 additionally stands as a testament to the value of 
bicameral legislatures. 
13 Austin, above n 8, 174. 
14 Austi, above n 8, 174. 
15 Austin, above n 8, 174, n 12. 
16 Austin, above n 8, 174. 
17 Austin, above n 8, at 174.
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In short, whenever we talk of laws governing the irrational world, the metaphorical application of 
the term law is suggested by this double analogy. The successive and synchronous phenomena 
composing the irrational world, happen and exist, for the most part, in uniform series: which 
uniformity of succession and coexistence resembles the uniformity of conduct produced by an 
imperative law. That uniformity of succession and coexistence, like the uniformity of conduct 
produced by an imperative law, springs from the will and intention of an intelligent and rational 
author. 
Now invited to comment, Darwin counters with the observation that in both Austin's 
examples of metaphorical law, the "intelligent and rational author" is God. He recalls an 
earlier discussion where Austin asserted that "divine law is the measure or test of positive law 
and morality" [Darwin's emphasis] and  that "law and morality, in so far as they are what 
they ought to be, conform, or are not repugnant to the law of God" [Austin's emphasis]. 18 
However, Darwin rationalises, once we question the divine origins of man we must also 
question any divine measure of man's laws. In other words, the category of metaphorical 
laws is meaningless if its basis is that such uniform phenomena can be traced to a divine 
author. Austin ponders his new neighbour's reasoning and begins to wonder if Bentham's 
influence has set him up as a straw man. 19 
Inspired by Darwin, Austin quickly realises that, once divine laws are discounted, the 
challenge is to determine the boundary between the laws of man and the laws of nature, 
admitting the possibility that the laws of man are not entirely removed from the instinctive 
basis of animal behaviour in the laws of nature. He reasons: 20 
It is true that the instincts of animal man, like many of his affections which are not instinctive, are 
amongst the causes of laws in the proper acceptation of the term. … But nothing can be more absurd 
than the ranking with laws themselves the causes which lead to their existence. And if human 
instincts are laws because they are causes of laws, there is scarcely a faculty or affection belonging 
to the human mind, and scarcely a class of objects presented by the outward world, that must not be 
esteemed a law and an appropriate subject of jurisprudence. 21 
18 Austin, above n 8, 6. 
19 After all, Bentham largely set himself up as a straw man. See CFA Marmoy "The 'auto­icon' of Jeremy 
Bentham at University College" (1958) 2 Medical History 77. 
20 Austin, above n 8, 177. 
21 Surely here Austin is ahead of his time in foreshadowing late 20 th Century critical scholarship.
DARWIN'S VOYAGE THROUGH THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 649 
649 
However, as Austin suggests, something more than mere instinct must lie at the heart of 
law's origin — something more is required in the distinction between proper and improper 
laws. Part III introduces a case study to explore what might distinguish proper from 
improper laws. 
III ON THE ORIGIN OF LAWS 
The jurisprudential consequence of Darwin's work is that the origins of law must be 
considered to lie somewhere along the evolutionary path travelled by our ancestors. 
Consequently, it is possible to imagine a point in the irretrievably distant past at which our 
behaviour was subject only to instinct and the laws of nature, "laws" that Austin would 
originally have considered merely metaphorical. And yet, undisputably, we are now subject 
to laws properly falling within the boundaries of the province of jurisprudence. However, the 
temporal remoteness of our ancestral metaphorical laws bedevils an analysis of qualitative 
evolution in human law to confirm the intervening existence of metamorphorical laws. I 
therefore propose a non­human case study to look for proof of the potential for upwards 
movement of metaphorical laws. 
In choosing an appropriate case study, I have been guided by Austin's own examples of 
metaphorical laws. I have avoided examples based on the movement of lifeless bodies, as 
they do not respond to accommodate our desires. 22 At the other end of the metaphorical laws 
spectrum, we find that certain animals such as dogs do, in fact, modify their behaviour to 
accommodate our desires. I have, therefore, chosen to look at the behaviour of bees as an 
example lying somewhere in between these two extremes. I do not mean to suggest that what 
goes on within the beehive amounts to rational law making for a civilised society. However, 
the example of bees offers insight into the conditions that might distinguish laws proper from 
laws improper. 
Bees live together and operate as a group, rather than as isolated individuals. This social 
nature increases the likelihood that their behaviour may be governed by more than basic 
instincts. Bees also have a highly evolved language of "dances" that has been described as "the 
second most complicated language in nature". 23 Indeed, given their social and 
22 As the Indiana pi law demonstrates, lifeless bodies such as pendulums do not modify their behaviour 
according to our laws. See above n 12. 
23 James Gould and Carol Grant Gould The Honey Bee (Scientific American Library, New York, 1988) 69. 
The Goulds do not expressly state which natural language is the most complex. On the basis of the 
unnatural phoneme of a palatal n, I would have suggested Icelandic.
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communicative nature, descriptions of bee society could easily be mistaken for our own were 
apian references to be removed. For example: 24 
The whole fabric of honey bee society depends on communication — on an innate ability to send 
and receive messages, to encode and decode information. Only by speaking the same language from 
the outset can a colony of as many as 60,000 short­lived individuals coordinate its efforts and avert 
chaos. 
One of the central roles served by the bees' language is to bespeak the existence and 
location of food. The bees' language is sufficiently evolved to communicate abstracted 
information regarding food found away from the hive and at an earlier point in time. For 
example, when a bee has found food away from the hive, she will indicate its location to 
other bees by doing the "waggle dance", repeatedly marking out a figure­eight on the inside 
wall of the hive. 25 The straight­run of the eight indicates the direction from the hive in the 
horizontal plane, as if the dancing bee had drawn a "map" on the vertical wall of the hive. The 
other bees read the map according to the convention that the sun is at the top of the vertical 
plane, just as our convention posits North at the top of our maps. The line of the dance 
therefore indicates the food's location in relation to the sun. The food's distance from the hive 
is indicated by the speed of the dance and by peeping noises made by the bee. To put it in 
non­legal terms, distance is inversely proportional to speed and to the logarithm of the rate of 
peeping. 26 However, using the vertical plane to represent the direction of the sun is only one 
version of the waggle dance, a version necessitated because the hive is usually dark. If there is 
a light source in the hive, bees orientate the waggle dance to the light source rather than using 
the convention of the vertical plane. 
Thus far, however, the language and behaviour of bees suggests nothing more than a 
further example of Austin's metaphorical law. The bees' behaviour is governed by instinct 
and experience. Even though the instinctive and experienced behaviour of bees produces 
conduct that is in the best interests of the hive this is not nearly enough to be characterised as 
24 Gould above n 23, 47. See also Bernard Mandeville's classic political satire: FB Kaye (ed) The Fable of the 
Bees (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924). But see Aristophanes The Wasps. 
25 In contrast, if food is close to the hive, the bee who found it will do "round dance" when she returns to 
the hive. The foundational research on the language of bees was under taken by Karl von Frisch. See 
The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967). 
26 Richard Dawkins River Out of Eden (Basic Books, New York, 1995) 87. In plain English, the faster and 
noisier the dance, the closer the food.
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law. It is merely uniform conduct that resembles conduct governed by law and thus remains at 
the metaphorical level. As Austin concluded, instinct might cause law but it is not itself law. 
To be able to state that laws have evolved above the metaphorical level, therefore, behoves 
more evidence than just hungry bees. A slight change in circumstances, however, provides a 
further step towards law. 
The bees' language has evolved because the ability to communicate the location of food is 
in the best interests of the hive. However, a society where all individuals instinctively act in a 
manner that promotes the common good is an ill­suited basis on which to advance our 
understanding of law. There is more to be gained by the study of societies where individual 
behaviour runs contrary to the common good. It is possible to produce such behaviour in 
bees by introducing a simple variation into the previous example — bees can be made to lie. 
Returning bees were belayed at the entrance to the hive and their eyes painted over with 
black paint. The blind bees were then allowed into the hive but could not see that a light had 
been turned on inside. The blind bees proceeded to do the waggle dance as if it were dark in 
the hive, using the vertical plane to indicate the direction of the food. However, the sighted 
bees read the dance in relation to the light source inside the hive and made a beeline in the 
opposite direction. Having been forced to lie, the blind bees had unwittingly sent their 
colleagues off on a wild flower chase. 
We must bemoan the fact that the researchers paid little attention to the interdisciplinary 
potential of their experiment. Had they but harkened to Hart's befitting words: 27 
They throw a light which makes us see much in law that lay hidden; but the light is so bright that it 
blinds us to the remainder and so leaves us still without a clear view of the whole. 
The world of jurisprudence would have been abuzz had they only recorded what befell 
the bees who blindly lied to the hive. Were, for example, the blind bees punished? If so, did it 
make the other bees wary? Was the punishment merely the outcome of instinctive behaviour 
by the other bees? If instinctive, what further conditions are required for the bees to 
distinguish between strict liability offences and those that consider intent? What is it that 
allows us to distinguish between punishment that is merely instinctive and punishment that 
might be said to result from the operation of law, between the causes of law and law itself? 
What lies between the region of metaphorical laws and the boundary of the province of 
jurisprudence? 
27 Hart, above n 1, 2.
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As noted earlier, for mankind the answers to such questions lie in the irretrievably distant 
past. Our best hope to truly understand law is to watch for its evolution in other species. 
However, as regards interdisciplinary research, most jurisprudes are drawn only by the 
beacon of social science, while, for their part, natural scientists rarely regard working with 
lawyers as the bee's knees. Thus, it is unlikely that empirical research will be carried out to 
establish that proper laws evolve from improper once and the intervening existence of 
metamorphorical laws. Yet the simple example of bees suggests minimum conditions for the 
evolution of law, conditions too obvious to belabour here. Perhaps all will become clear when 
behaviourist Konrad Lorenz befriends Austin. 28 
IV CONCLUSION 
A sociologist is once reported to have concluded that it takes 150 years for 90 per cent  of 
the population to accept a fundamental challenge to long held beliefs. 29 The extreme nature 
of Darwin's challenge to our beliefs is reflected in the slow progress of acceptance against the 
timeline of resistance. Approaching the sesquicentennial mark, only 12 per cent  of Americans 
accept a strict interpretation of Darwin's theory of evolution, though a further 37 per cent 
accepted an interpretation that involved God guiding evolution; 45 per cent retained a strict 
creationist belief. 30 That Austin took little account of Darwin's theory is understandable; he 
died only a few weeks after Darwin's publication of Origin of the Species and well before the 
1871 appearance of The Descent of Man. However, the anachronistic scenario of Darwin 
replacing Bentham as Austin's influential neighbour suggests interesting consequences for 
Austin's classification of laws. Discounting divine laws, Austin's challenge is to distinguish 
between the laws of man and laws of nature. Recognising that the laws of man must at an 
28 In 1973, Lorenz received the Nobel Prize for Medicine, an award he shared with bee researcher Karl 
von Frisch. 
29 I have not been able to trace the source of this useful conclusion. I asked a sociologist colleague if she 
was familiar with the study. She replied that "No sociologist would say that. It has numbers in it! As a 
statement it doesn't make sense — what does it mean by challenge to beliefs? Does it mean changing 
existing ones? What types of beliefs? What type of challenge? It's meaningless. It was probably a lawyer 
attributing nonsense to a sociologist." Thus I am left to rely on the hearsay account and assume it to be 
at least as accurate as the Indiana pi law example. 
30 Deborah Jordan Brooks "Substantial numbers of Americans continue to doubt evolution as explanation 
of origins of humans" (5 March 2001) Press Release  <www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010305.asp>. 
The survey used a random telephone survey of 1,000 adults, 18 years and older and was conducted 19­ 
21 February 2001. The survey results show little change from previous surveys over the past 20 years.
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earlier point themselves have been laws of nature suggests that the quality of a law can 
change, that is that improper laws may evolve to the level of proper laws.
